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Future Social Market Economy 
Tariffs impede trade. They are the most visible instrument for protecting domestic 
companies against foreign competition. So-called non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs) 
are less visible. NTBs include restricting import quantities, registration formalities for 
imports or state aid for domestic suppliers. Our study shows that NTBs implemented 
worldwide between 2010 and 2015 have been responsible for roughly 16 percent of 
missing global trade in 2015, amounting to about USD 512 billion. German exports 
could have been at least USD 43 billion higher in 2015 if these NTBs had not existed. 
The value of German imports in 2015 would have been at least USD 34 billion higher 
than the actual volume of imports. 
 
Non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs) are signifi-
cantly more difficult to measure than tariff-based 
barriers to trade, i.e. tariffs on imported products. 
The spectrum of NTBs ranges from restrictions 
on the quantity of permitted imports to special 
technological requirements through to state aid 
for domestic companies (tab. 1). 
 
The "Global Trade Alert” (GTA) Database, which 
was established after the financial and economic 
crisis broke out in 2008, records newly imple-
mented NTBs worldwide. The Database docu-
ments the following information for each NTB in-
troduced since the beginning of 2009: the coun-
try implementing the NTB; the trading partners  
and products affected by the trade restrictions; 
and the date on which the NTB was introduced. 
 
The 151 countries monitored adopted a total of 
more than 5,600 new protectionist measures be-
tween the beginning of 2009 and July 2017. 
More than 3,000 of them were NTBs. Since 
many of these policies are no longer in force at 
the present time, the number of NTBs still en-
forced in 2016 was roughly 2,400. In 2015, the 
year for which we estimate NTB-related trade re-
duction below, 2,212 NTBs were in force. In 
2009, the first year covered here, there were just 
under 390 NTBs.  
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Who implements NTBs and whom 
do these policies affect? 
 
The United States implemented by far the most 
NTBs between the beginning of 2009 and July 
2017. That is not an exemplary performance for 
the number one in global trade, which presented 
itself as the leading advocate of free trade and 
open markets until recently. This becomes even 
clearer if one considers the distance between the 
United States and India: with 312 measures, In-
dia introduced the second highest number of 
NTBs. The United States introduced about 800 
NTBs, nearly twice the number of India. It should 
also be noted here that the United States largely 
adopted these protectionist policies long before 
the inauguration of the Trump administration. 
China – the number two in global trade, just be-
hind the United States – implemented only 112 
measures and lands in 9th place as a result.  
 
Germany, which has implemented roughly 130 
individual measures, occupies 5th place (fig. 1).  
 
It can also be seen that largely developing and 
emerging economies make up the countries that 
have introduced the most NTBs (7 of 10). These 
countries are catching up in terms of development 
and therefore may be trying to protect domestic 
producers against international competitive pres-
sure by implementing NTBs. At the same time, it 
should be stressed that the United States and 
Germany, the largest export and import nations in 
the world, are among the countries increasingly 
introducing NTBs. On closer analysis, it also be-
comes clear that industrialized nations are imple-
menting more and more NTBs, in particular 
against other industrialized nations, to make im-
ports more expensive. 
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It is also possible to calculate how frequently a 
country was affected by the NTBs introduced be-
tween 2009 and 2017 because the NTB policy 
was directed at imports from this country. This 
shows that Germany is the country whose exports 
were affected the most by the NTBs implemented 
between 2009 and 2017. With the exception of 
China, exclusively industrialized nations are 
among the ten economies that are the target of 
most of these instruments (fig. 2).  
On the one hand, this reflects the dominance of 
industrialized nations in global trade: Countries 
that trade a lot are also the focus of the other trad-
ing partners' NTBs. On the other hand, four coun-
tries are in both top 10 rankings: three industrial-
ized nations – the United States, Germany and It-
faly – and China as the only developing or emerg-
ing economy. This shows that at least some of the 
countries introducing many NTBs are also 
strongly affected by such NTBs themselves. It is 
certainly going too far to interpret this as system-
atic retaliatory measures. Nonetheless, this could 
be a sign that protectionism can end in a vicious 
circle of action and reaction damaging all partici-
pants over the long term. 
 
 
 
How much do NTBs restrict 
international trade? 
 
Methodology 
 
The critical issue in regard to the economic impact 
of NTBs is the question of whether – and if yes: 
how much – these trade barriers restrict interna-
tional trade.  It is very difficult to answer this ques-
tion methodologically. Among others, this is due 
to the fact that the NTBs identified here are very 
different in nature. Therefore the strength of their 
impact can also be very different. For example, a 
newly introduced documentation obligation with 
regard to technical quality requirements for an im-
ported electric shaver has a different economic 
impact than a policy where the quantity of permit-
ted automobile imports is restricted to just 70 per-
cent of the import volume in the previous year. 
 
Therefore, the effects of newly introduced NTBs 
on international exports and imports discussed 
below are only a rough approximation of the eco-
nomic impact of these protectionist policies. 
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The data on NTBs from the GTA database as well 
as a dataset on the bilateral trade relations be-
tween 152 countries in the period between 2010 
and 2015 serve as the starting point for the esti-
mates on the impact of NTBs on trade. The trade 
data used here differs between 177 products and 
product groups. The inclusion of these many prod-
ucts makes it possible to take account of the im-
portance of different import and export structures 
for the individual countries. Econometric esti-
mates examine the impact that introducing trade 
restriction policies will have on the volume of trade 
for the affected countries. Specifically, the impact 
of the three overarching protectionist policies – 
changing import duties, introducing protective 
trade policy measures and implementing NTBs – 
is analyzed to start with. The next step in the anal-
ysis is to examine the effects of introducing NTBs 
in a differentiated manner. To this end, the influ-
ence of four types of NTBs is studied (import con-
trols, state aid and subsidies, public procurement 
and local economic policy, other NTBs, see tab. 
1). These econometric estimates include a total of 
slightly more than 4.4 million individual observa-
tions (see Yalcin, Kinzius and Felbermayr, 2017: 
18 – 21 for methodological details). 
 
Empirical results 
 
The introduction of at least one NTB on average 
for all countries and products leads to a decline of 
up to 12% in imports between the countries af-
fected (i.e. the country adopting the policy and the 
country whose exports to the policy-adopting 
country are affected) over the analyzed period 
(2010 to 2015). 
 
If the effects on trade are broken down by sector, 
there are sectoral differences. The trade-reducing 
effect of NTBs is particularly great in the commod-
ity sector (incl. ores, minerals, electricity, gas and 
water). The introduction of at least one NTB leads 
to an average decline of just under 26 percent in 
the corresponding bilateral trade. In the agricul-
tural sector, including forestry and fishing, the av-
erage drop in trade was roughly 8.4 percent. The 
calculated effect on trade here was the lowest in 
all the examined sectors. The declines in trade for 
the other analyzed sectors are between these 
amounts (metals and machinery: -14%; consumer 
goods and non-durable goods: -10%). 
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If the empirically estimated trade impact resulting 
from the introduction of NTBs is used to project 
the associated changes in global exports and im-
ports, it is possible to arrive at the following ap-
proximative calculations for international trade, 
defined as the total of all imports worldwide (see 
Yalcin, Kinzius and Felbermayr 2017: 31 et 
seqq.): 
 
 According to estimates by experts at the 
International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank, the global volume of all im-
ports could have grown by 4.4 percent in 
2015 if there had not been any policies re-
stricting trade (see Constantinescu, Mat-
too and Ruta 2015: 47). 
 Based on international trade data from 
the World Bank, the global volume of im-
ports could have reached USD 19.9 tril-
lion in 2015. 
 In fact, the volume of imports in the global 
economy reached only USD 16.7 trillion in 
2015, i.e. USD 3.2 trillion less than the ex-
pected amount. 
 If the average effect of NTBs of 12%, as 
calculated above, is transferred to those 
imports affected by NTBs, this produces 
the following estimated amounts: the vol-
ume of global imports in 2015 was re-
duced by 3.1% or about 512 billion USD 
due to the NTBs newly implemented 
worldwide between 2010 and 2015. This 
corresponds to about 16 percent of the 
estimated loss of USD 3.2 trillion in im-
ports in 2015. 
 
In other words: the NTBs implemented between 
2010 and 2015 are responsible for roughly 16 per-
cent of missing global trade according to this ap-
proximative calculation. 
 
This approach can also be applied to the exports 
and imports of individual countries (tab. 2). It 
should be stressed that this involves so-called 
partial estimates. They can lead to an over- or un-
derestimate in this linear projection since the em-
pirical analysis involves the average effects 
across all countries in the world. The NTB-in-
duced effects for individual countries are therefore 
higher or lower than the average. If the NTB-
based global declines in imports of USD 500 bil-
lion are calculated back to all countries in the 
world relative to their global share of trading, a 
conservative projection produces the values for 
the EU, China and the US listed in table 2.  
 
The results of the calculations in table 2 can be 
interpreted in the case of Germany as follows: 
 
 If all the NTBs implemented worldwide 
between 2010 and 2015 had not been in-
troduced, German exports in 2015 would 
have been about USD 43 billion higher 
than they actually were. This amount cor-
responds to roughly 1.2 percent of Ger-
many's GDP in 2015. 
 German imports would have been roughly 
USD 34 billion higher if these trade barri-
ers had not been introduced (roughly 0.9 
percent of German GDP in 2015). 
 
It should be stressed that the figures for Germany 
are conservative estimates since German compa-
nies are confronted by NTBs more often than 
other countries due to their high export activity. 
 
In absolute terms, the calculated declines in ex-
ports are only higher than Germany in the United 
States and China, at just over USD 49 and 73 bil-
lion respectively. In percentage terms, the de-
clines in exports due to NTBs are the greatest in 
Belgium, Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia, each at 
more than 2 percent. In particular, small open 
countries such as Belgium or Slovakia, whose im-
ports and exports account for a significant share 
of the gross domestic product, are affected more 
strongly by NTBs since these countries trade a 
wide range of products and are therefore im-
pacted much more frequently by protectionist pol-
icies. In the case of large countries such as the 
United States or Germany, their trading of a wide 
range of products also increases the likelihood of 
NTBs restricting trade. Furthermore, substantially 
more potential trade is hindered overall due to the 
existing higher absolute volume of trade. 
 
A final look at the five sectors examined above 
shows clearly that the metals and machinery sec-
tor in Germany is affected the most in absolute 
terms by the NTBs introduced around the world 
between 2010 and 2015 (tab. 3). This is one of the 
most important German export sectors. 
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Economic Policy Conclusions 
 
The importance of tariffs as barriers to trade has 
decreased in recent decades. This is due to the 
WTO's tariff reduction rounds in particular. At the 
same time, however, more and more countries 
are resorting to non-tariff barriers to trade. This 
trend has increased substantially since the finan-
cial and economic crisis. This is a worrying de-
velopment since NTBs slow global trade just like 
tariffs. Our analysis has shown that NTBs can be 
held responsible for up to 16 percent of the de-
cline in global trade. The resulting losses for Ger-
many total 0.9 percent of GDP due to lower im-
ports and 1.2 percent due to lower exports. 
 
Since the WTO process has stalled, current bilat-
eral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are an op-
portunity to reduce NTBs and boost trade be-
tween countries and regions. For example, the 
EU has reached a political agreement on an FTA 
with Japan this year and is negotiating other 
FTAs with major trading partners in Asia and 
Latin America (Jungbluth 2017). The elimination 
of NTBs plays an important role in the negotia-
tions. This is a positive development from a trade 
policy perspective. In the future, however, it 
would be desirable to address NTBs – analogous 
to tariff reduction rounds – under the multilateral 
umbrella of the WTO again. The long-term goal 
should be uniform regulations and standards 
around the world in order to ensure fair frame-
work conditions for international competition. 
 
Particular attention should be paid to special 
economic relationships between industrialized 
countries on the one hand and developing and 
emerging countries on the other: So less devel-
oped countries can benefit more from the inter-
national division of labor, industrialized nations 
should open their markets, possibly also unilater-
ally, for products from these countries and roll 
back NTBs. This will require greater willingness 
to compromise on the part of developed coun-
tries. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the lion's share of 
missing global trade, namely 84%, is not due to 
NTBs, but rather other factors. These factors in-
clude:  
 
 weak global growth worldwide since the 
bankruptcy of Lehmann Brothers in 
2008;  
 falling commodity prices; 
 weaker economic growth in China due to 
the transformation toward more of a con-
sumption- and service-driven growth 
model; 
 the trend in the direction of a service so-
ciety, which slows cross-border trade 
since many service providers are local 
by nature and therefore make trading dif-
ficult internationally. 
 
The reduction in the NTBs is only one part of the 
economic policy challenges to be focused on. 
The aforementioned aspects should also be 
taken into account and addressed on a national 
and international level, if possible. 
 
 
 
Further reading 
 
 Constantinescu, Cristina, Aaditya Mattoo 
und Michele Ruta (2015). “The Global 
Trade Slowdown”. The Global Trade 
Slowdown: A New Normal. A VoxEU.org 
eBook. 33–53. 
 Jungbluth, Cora (2017). Trump & Brexit 
– European-Asian Economic Relations 
under New Conditions. Bertelsmann Stif-
tung, Gütersloh. 
 Yalcin, Erdal, Luisa Kinzius und Gabriel 
Felbermayr (2017). Hidden Protection-
ism: Non-tariff Barriers and Implications 
for International Trade. Bertelsmann Stif-
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